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Abstract 
This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled 
Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally 
justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach 
to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of 
moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. 
The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by 
identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral 
justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse 
ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its 
reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by 
pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology. 
1. Introduction 
This article and its companion piece in this issue of Metaphilosophy, “Naturalizing Moral Justification,” 
are part of our book in progress. The overall aim of the book is to advance philosophical understanding 
of how moral claims may be justified in contemporary real‐world circumstances characterized by 
cultural and religious diversity and by social inequality. Our work has both critical and constructive 
aspects. On the critical side, we argue that several prominent philosophical theories of moral 
justification are flawed because they are idealized in ways that render them susceptible to misuse by 
those with more social power. We believe that this flaw stems from the theories' shared reliance on an 
underlying conception of moral epistemology that is also invidiously idealized. On the constructive side, 
we advocate naturalizing moral epistemology by studying how moral claims are justified in real‐world 
situations of diversity and inequality. We argue that such study can provide philosophers with resources 
for developing alternative models of moral justification appropriate for varying contexts. Our overall 
proposal offers an alternative to the search for a one‐size‐fits‐all method of moral justification that is 
supposed to work in all moral situations.  
This first article presents some of our critical work. It begins by outlining the conception of moral 
epistemology that we later challenge, and it then explains our standards for assessing theoretical 
models and real‐world practices designed to achieve moral justification. We draw on these standards to 
evaluate critically the model of moral justification advocated by discourse ethics, which provides one 
philosophical account of moral justification that relies on the conception of moral epistemology that we 
dispute. At the end of the article, we explain several forms of damaging idealization that infect, 
respectively, discourse ethics and its underlying epistemological assumptions. We conclude by pointing 
to the need to rethink both the mission and method of moral epistemology. In our companion article, 
we explain the new method we recommend for pursuing the new mission. 
2. A Modern Western Conception of Moral Epistemology 
Moral disagreement is a familiar feature of daily life. In Western societies, people frequently disagree 
with others over issues of public policy, such as immigration, the death penalty, and the supposed right 
to die, and also over issues of personal conduct, such as whether or not we should be vegetarian or buy 
only fair trade goods. Often we are able to resolve such disagreements by appealing to shared values, 
such as the right to life and opposition to cruelty, or by using familiar argumentative strategies such as 
suggesting that one person try to imagine herself in another's shoes. Some disputes resist resolution, 
however, because disputants may interpret or weight similar values differently or even appeal to 
divergent values. It is particularly difficult to reach shared agreement in situations when disagreement is 
linked with membership in diverse moral communities. One example of such intractable disagreement is 
the debate over the recent French and Belgian laws banning face coverings in public places.1 Other 
contemporary examples include: female genital cutting; the Danish cartoons portraying the Prophet as a 
terrorist; and the controversy over consuming whale meat in the Northern Territories of Canada.  
A central task of moral epistemology is to explain how recalcitrant disputes like these can be addressed 
rationally and which moral claims are authoritative and why. Historically, moral claims have often been 
thought authoritative in virtue of their supposedly privileged sources, such as the wisdom of the 
ancients or the gods or certain sacred practices or texts. Today, Western philosophers usually think that 
the authority of moral claims is established through using certain privileged models of reasoning, whose 
use maximizes the probability of producing reliable conclusions (moral methodology). Philosophers also 
explain why using these models to guide our reasoning confers moral authority on the conclusions we 
reach (moral epistemology). 
When models of moral justification are conceived in this way, they are analogous to philosophers' 
accounts of scientific methods whose use confers scientific authority on some empirical claims. By 
definition, relying on scientific methods constitutes what it is to do science. Similarly, reliance on good 
methods of moral reasoning is constitutive of moral rationality. A moral claim that is justified through 
good reasoning has rational warrant and is morally authoritative. Some moral epistemologists assert 
that using their recommended model of moral reasoning enables users to attain the moral point of view. 
This is an imagined vantage point supposed to provide a uniquely privileged perspective from which 
moral disagreements may be authoritatively assessed. 
Even if a moral claim is justified by good reasoning, this does not entail that it is true in some robust 
metaphysical sense, just as good scientific reasoning does not always result in empirical truth and sound 
legal procedures do not always result in convicting the guilty and exonerating the innocent. Yet although 
good scientific methods and sound legal procedures are fallible, they provide our best means of 
justifying empirical claims and for determining legal liability. Similarly, our best available moral 
reasoning provides the most authoritative guide we have for morally appropriate action. 
If moral epistemologists' mission is to identify models of reasoning whose use enables reasoners to 
justify only authoritative moral claims, how can epistemologists accomplish this mission? Contemporary 
moral philosophers do not expect to derive inspiration from real‐world reasoning practices because they 
view these as susceptible to flaws and fallacies. Instead, they are more likely to pursue their mission 
through a priori methods, such as reflecting on the necessary and universal conditions of moral 
reasoning or imagining how moral reasoning would occur in ideal conditions. Sometimes they present 
fictitious or hypothetical accounts of how moral claims might be justified. In a 2003 interview, Galen 
Strawson identified a priori arguments as those you can see the truth of “just lying on your couch. You 
don't have to get up off your couch and go outside and examine the way things are in the physical 
world. You don't have to do any science.”2 
This article challenges the idea that the mission of moral epistemology is to identify a uniquely 
privileged model of moral reasoning enabling those who use it to attain a single authoritative moral 
point of view. Instead, we contend that people begin from multiple moral starting points and need a 
variety of methodological strategies or maps in order to reach multiple moral destinations. In our 
companion article, we challenge the idea that any such projects of epistemological mapping can be 
performed successfully by solitary philosophers from their armchairs or couches. 
3. Assessing Models and Practices of Moral Justification 
3.1. The Need to Assess 
Cultural, religious, and moral communities are characterized by broad agreement among their members 
on how moral claims should be justified, although members may sometimes disagree about how to 
interpret and utilize methods of justification that are supposedly shared. When moral disputes occur 
among communities rather than within them, however, people often disagree more fundamentally 
about which methods are appropriate for addressing the dispute. In order to address moral disputes in 
ways that lead to morally rational or authoritative conclusions across as well as within cultural 
boundaries, it is necessary to find practices of justification that enable people who use them to 
adjudicate fairly among the various moral perspectives in play without prejudging crucial questions at 
issue. In situations of diversity and inequality, it is important that all salient perspectives be accorded 
due respect, rather than be disregarded or repressed, and that processes of moral reasoning be 
unbiased by social power and privilege. To determine whether or not particular models or practices of 
moral justification can meet these very general standards when they are employed in real-world 
contexts, we offer four conditions for assessing them. 
3.2. Four Conditions of Adequacy 
In this section, we explain four conditions for assessing whether particular models and practices of 
moral reasoning are likely to reach reliable and authoritative conclusions when used in contexts of 
diversity and inequality. The four conditions work together, building on ideas already familiar in Western 
moral epistemology.3 In our view, a reasoning model or practice that fails any of these conditions when 
used in a particular context cannot, in this or similar contexts, confer moral authority on the substantive 
claims that it is intended to support. In such contexts it would not be morally rational to use this model 
or practice.4 
3.2.1. Plausibility to the Disputants 
To justify a normative conclusion is to explain convincingly why it has moral authority. If the authority of 
moral claims derives from the soundness of the reasoning used to support them, it must be possible to 
provide an illuminating and plausible metanarrative explaining why using a particular reasoning model 
or practice tends to produce conclusions that are not morally arbitrary but instead have moral force or 
weight. We agree with Onora O'Neill that practical reasoning must be intelligible or followable in 
thought. O'Neill writes, “We fail to reason as soon as we make moves which we hold that others for 
whom we expect reasons to be cogent cannot follow; we must expect such moves to seem bafflingly 
arbitrary to those others” (1996, 60). We contend that one condition for the adequacy of any reasoning 
model or practice in a given context of dispute is that it should be possible to tell a story the disputants 
find plausible that explains why using this reasoning model or practice confers moral authority on the 
conclusions reached when it is used correctly. 
3.2.2. Usability by the Disputants 
Usability is a second necessary condition of adequacy for any proposed model or practice of moral 
justification. People involved in moral disputes must not only regard the reasoning practices utilized in 
addressing the disputes as authoritative, they must also be able to participate in using those practices. If 
people cannot participate in reasoning about moral claims, they are not acting as full moral agents in 
situations of justification but merely waiting passively to be told what is right or wrong. The condition of 
usability does not mean that all involved must be able to participate as formal equals. To interpret the 
condition in this way would violate the first condition because it would rule by fiat that only certain 
reasoning practices are capable of generating authoritative moral conclusions. Instead, the condition of 
usability requires that people be able to participate in a way that accords with whatever strategies of 
justification their communities regard as authoritative. This may require, for example, that participants 
utilize particular rituals or forms of speech. This interpretation of our usability condition may appear to 
open the door to domination, but our first and third conditions are designed to block this door. 
3.2.3. Nonabuse of Power and Vulnerability by Any Disputant 
Our third condition for the adequacy of reasoning practices is that they cannot rely on abusing power or 
vulnerability. It is uncontroversial that physical force is not a strategy for rational persuasion; a 
normative claim obviously does not gain moral authority because someone is physically bullied into 
paying lip service to it. Power can also be abused in ways that are less obvious, however, especially 
where those involved are socially unequal to each other. 
All people have a range of characteristics that increase our social power or vulnerability according to the 
situations in which we find ourselves. Our social vulnerabilities and powers depend on the value or 
disvalue that prevailing social structures award to these characteristics. Social structures differentiate 
people's standing based on various characteristics and create differing social possibilities and risks of 
harm. For instance, although everyone is physically vulnerable to biological infirmity and random 
hazards, poor people are in addition socially vulnerable because they are deprived of many resources for 
dealing with life's con tingencies. Social structures create and maintain social powers and vulnerabilities 
on the basis of a wide range of characteristics such as people's family connections, wealth, caste, 
religion, educational credentials, nationality, skin color, sex, and age. 
Power and vulnerability are abused when people take wrongful advantage of them. Abuses of social 
power often involve hierarchies, which are socially authorized systems of unequal power and 
vulnerability. Some hierarchies such as slavery are intrinsically unjust, but social hierarchies can also 
fulfill a range of legitimate social purposes in institutions such as government, medicine, education, the 
military, or religion. Although hierarchies are not inherently abusive, the inequalities they create provide 
opportunities for office holders to abuse their social power by using it for purposes other than those for 
which it was authorized. For example, scientists may take corporate money to falsify their findings and 
politicians, priests, teachers, or other officials may extort bribes or sexual favors. Power may be abused 
even when it arguably makes both parties better off, as in some cases of corruption or exploitation. In 
unjust hierarchies, most uses of power by those with more privilege are likely to be abusive, but 
sometimes unjust power may be utilized in nonabusive ways; for instance, unjustly privileged people 
may use their power to assist people who are vulnerable or even to subvert the system as a whole. Not 
all hierarchies are formal, based in institutions with legal force; many are informal or inexplicit. This 
allows another type of power abuse to occur when informal power is used to subvert situations in which 
participants are formally equal, such as when bribery or social connections are used to influence 
supposedly meritocratic decisions about allocating educational positions or jobs. Abuses of social power 
may often be unintentional rather than deliberate, since superior social power and privilege are 
frequently invisible to those who possess them. 
In contexts of moral justification, abuse occurs when some disputants take wrongful advantage of their 
own power or others' vulnerability to discredit the views of others and make their own views appear 
unduly credible. This can happen in innumerable ways short of overt physical coercion. Abuse includes 
but is not limited to: misrepresentation or selective presentation of evidence, distortion, intimidation, 
logical trickery, mystification, ridicule, disregard, and refusal to understand. It also occurs when some 
disputants insist on a particular style of argumentation in which others are unskilled or uncomfortable 
or on using a vocabulary that does not fit well with the moral concepts of some disputants or is 
inadequate to express their perspectives. 
3.2.4. Practical Feasibility for the Disputants 
We noted earlier that our condition of plausibility resembles O'Neill's requirement that practical 
reasoning must be intelligible or followable in thought. O'Neill also specifies a second type of 
followability, namely, that practical reasoning can advocate only proposals that are followable in the 
sense of being real possibilities for action in the relevant sphere. She writes, “Proposals for action will 
therefore not be reasoned unless they are not only intelligible, but real possibilities for those who are to 
be offered reasons for certain recommendations or prescriptions, warnings or proscriptions. … We 
cannot give others reason for adopting principles which we do not think they could adopt” (1996, 57–
58). We take our lead from O'Neill in contending that no model or practice of moral justification can be 
rational in a given context if it prescribes a course of action that is not feasible or realistically possible for 
some people in the situation. 
3.2.5. The Sources of Our Adequacy Conditions 
Our conditions for assessing models and practices of justification are intended to provide a more 
detailed elaboration of our basic—and we think uncontroversial—assumption about moral justification, 
namely, that no reasoning practice confers moral authority in a given context if it is initially biased 
against any of those involved or their views. We stipulate the condition of plausibility because it is an 
essential condition of explanation in any field; a moral claim cannot be justified for any individual or 
group unless it is based on reasoning whose moral force they recognize. We stipulate the condition of 
usability because moral claims cannot be justified for people who are unable to participate in the 
reasoning used to support them. We stipulate that practices which depend on abusing vulnerability or 
power cannot confer moral authority on any substantive conclusions, because rationality of all kinds is 
widely contrasted with abusing power.5 Finally, our acceptance of the belief that “ought” implies “can” 
explains our stipulation that a practice of justification is not rational in a given context unless it 
recommends courses of action that are realistically possible for all of those involved. 
3.3. How We Analyze Models and Practices of Reasoning Intended for Moral 
Justification 
We use the four conditions above to assess both philosophical models proposed by several prominent 
moral philosophers and actual practices of moral justification used by nonphilosophers in some real‐
world moral disputes. Our critical appraisals focus on four interrelated aspects of philosophical models 
and real‐world reasoning practices. 
First, we look at the way a particular model or practice delineates the moral domain. Philosophical 
models of moral justification offer general maps of the sphere of morality and explain why they draw 
the boundaries in one place rather than another; for instance, they typically separate morality from 
convention, law, theology, and anthropology and explain why they differentiate among these. People 
engaged in real‐world disputes also delineate a moral domain by the way that they frame the issues at 
stake. For example, people disputing whale or seal hunting may frame the disputes as issues of cultural 
colonization, resistance, and survival, as issues of animal cruelty, or as issues of species preservation or 
ecological balance. To assess the ways in which models or practices of moral justification enable people 
to delineate the moral domain, we ask how they allow them to identify and interpret the moral issues at 
hand. 
Second, we look at how particular models and practices enable people to characterize moral agency. 
Within processes of justification, people (or other beings) might have moral standing in more than one 
way. They may participate as moral agents, whose voice is recognized in processes of justification; they 
may participate as informants providing testimony whose moral import is assessed by others; or they 
may be viewed simply as moral objects, beings of moral concern with a stake but not a legitimate voice 
in justificatory processes. For instance, children or even some cognitively disabled people may be 
regarded as informants, while battery chickens may be regarded merely as objects of moral concern. 
Third, we analyze the methods of reasoning proposed by philosophical models or utilized in real‐world 
practices. Which methods are recommended or permitted and which are rejected as illegitimate? What 
considerations may count as reasons or evidence, which are ruled inadmissible, and what are warranted 
inference patterns? We assess these, too, by reference to our four conditions. 
Finally, we consider the practical outcomes justified by using various models or practices of justification. 
When assessing a proposed philosophical model, we can only look at the general sorts of 
recommendations for action that it is likely to generate in circumstances of diversity and inequality. 
When we study real‐world cases, we are able to assess actual recommendations for action that are 
generated by using particular reasoning practices in particular contexts. In assessing practical 
recommendations for action, the condition of feasibility is especially salient. 
Even when the four conditions are accepted in principle, it is always possible for people to disagree 
about how to apply them in specific contexts. None of our conditions can be deployed mechanically, 
and, as we invoke them to assess the use of particular reasoning strategies, we offer arguments about 
what should count in particular contexts as plausibility, usability, power abuse, and practical feasibility. 
We recognize, however, that our arguments are challengeable. In any given context of moral 
justification, it will be possible to dispute whether or not a particular model or practice of justification 
truly is plausible, usable, abusive, or practically feasible. 
In this article, we use the conditions to assess the model of moral justification proposed in Jürgen 
Habermas's version of discourse or communicative ethics (Habermas 1990).  
4. Assessing the Discourse Ethics Model of Moral Justification 
4.1. The Basic Idea 
Discourse ethics is a proceduralist theory of justification which advocates that the authority of moral 
claims should be evaluated not directly by reference to their content but instead by reference to the 
reasoning through which they are justified. For proceduralist theories, a moral claim is authoritative if 
and only if it is justified by good reasoning. Discourse ethics offers a methodological account of good 
reasoning and an epistemological account of why it is good. 
Proponents of discourse ethics share the Kantian epistemological belief that impartiality is a necessary 
condition of moral rationality and the methodological belief that the impartiality of proposed normative 
recommendations can only be determined via an unforced consensus among all those affected. 
Habermas writes, “True impartiality pertains only to that standpoint from which one can generalize 
precisely those norms that can count on universal assent because they perceptibly embody an interest 
common to all affected. It is these norms that deserve intersubjective recognition. Thus the impartiality 
of judgment is expressed in a principle that constrains all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others 
in the balancing of interests” (1990, 65; emphasis in original). Discourse theorists believe that 
justification in morality, as in science, requires a rational intersubjective consensus within the relevant 
community. Their theory, however, is distinguished from other Kantian theories by its insistence that 
moral agreements cannot be validated through philosophical thought experiments but instead require 
real‐world discourse. Much of the discourse‐ethics literature focuses on explaining the idea of rational 
consensus. Briefly, discourse theorists regard moral claims as justified only if the process of 
argumentation from which they emerge conforms to certain rules designed to capture the conditions of 
“a speech situation immune to repression and inequality” and to rule out all “external or internal 
coercion other than the force of the better argument” (Habermas 1990, 88–89).6 Habermas contends 
that these rules are not mere conventions. Instead, they express the “unavoidable” or universal and 
necessary presuppositions of argumentative speech (1990, 81). Denying them while asserting moral 
convictions leads to a performative contradiction; the rules are presupposed by the idea of being 
convinced (1990, 90–91).  
Habermas is well aware that the conditions for a speech situation immune to repression and inequality 
will never be fully met in the real world (1990, 88). In real life, he observes, we must be satisfied with an 
“approximation adequate enough for the purpose of argumentation” (1990, 91–92). He believes, 
however, that the conditions can be approximated closely enough to avoid moral skepticism. Just as 
scientific conclusions may be objective despite being based on evidence that is fallible, so moral 
conclusions may be valid even though the reasoning used to support them is always contestable. 
The four conditions that we use to assess the model of moral justification offered by discourse ethics are 
not external or alien to this account of moral justification. The principled commitments of discourse 
ethics to impartiality, equality, and nonrepression all support the ideas that justificatory strategies 
should be plausible, usable, nonabusive, and practically feasible. Yet despite the overtly egalitarian and 
anti‐authoritarian commitments of discourse ethics, we argue that its recommended model of moral 
justification may often fail these conditions when it is used in circumstances of diversity and inequality. 
Our argument examines how discourse ethics delineates the moral domain, characterizes moral agency, 
defines moral reasoning, and recommends courses of action. 
4.2. How Discourse Ethics Delineates the Moral Domain 
First note: discourse ethics is designed for addressing only a limited range of what are ordinarily thought 
to be moral questions. These are questions of justice, which discourse ethics identifies as issues that can 
be universalized. Only universalizable claims are thought able to be extracted from their specific cultural 
contexts and to be possible objects of transcultural consensus, so only these can claim to be morally 
rational. Habermas writes: “[T]he universalization principle acts like a knife that makes razor‐sharp cuts 
between evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, between the good and the just. While 
cultural values may imply a claim to intersubjective acceptance, they are so inextricably intertwined with 
the totality of a particular form of life that they cannot be said to claim normative validity in the strict 
sense” (1990, 104). By contrast, questions of the good life are said to belong to “ethics” because they 
can be understood only in specific cultural contexts. These questions “have the advantage of being 
answerable within the horizon of lifeworld certainties,” that is, within the specific cultural contexts from 
which they emerged (1990, 178). They are not susceptible to transcultural consensus, however, and so 
agreements about them cannot claim objective or universal validity. 
Although discourse ethics delineates the moral domain in a way that appears conspicuously culture 
neutral, in practice this delineation systematically favors those cultures with more prestige and power in 
the current global order. This is because ideas and values that feature in dominant interpretations of the 
world are more likely to appear universal and culturally neutral than ideas and values used by the 
members of subordinated cultures, which are likely to appear particular and idiosyncratic. The point can 
be illustrated by the example of poverty. To many Westerners, this concept appears to have a universal 
meaning that is paradigmatically suited for justice analyses, but in fact poverty is understood differently 
across the world and takes its meaning from particular cultural contexts. Although Westerners typically 
define poverty in terms of access to material resources (or the money to purchase these), people 
elsewhere may define it in terms of access to physical security, leisure time, or particular communities 
or places; for instance, some Australian indigenous people regard themselves as poor if they lack kin 
relationships (Hunt 2010). What people take poverty to be depends on their conceptions of the good 
life.  
The example of poverty illustrates how, in a context of global diversity and inequality, the insistence that 
morality is universal and culture neutral, while ethics is local and culture saturated, lends itself to abuses 
of power. It is easy to see how monetary definitions of poverty, which are widely accepted and appear 
to many as culturally neutral, are likely to be privileged as expressing poverty's real meaning. “Money 
makes the world go round.” To the powerful, a monetary conception of poverty is likely to seem self‐
evidently “universalizable,” and this allows them to dismiss other conceptions either as 
misunderstandings or as mere cultural preferences. It then becomes plausible that many people in non‐
Western cultures are “really” poor, even if they do not recognize this. 
Poverty is a stigmatizing term. The mere ascription of poverty can be abusive when it disregards the 
value of the wealth that supposedly poor people take themselves to possess.7 In addition, ascriptions of 
poverty can become a rationale for abusive interventions touted as lifting out of poverty those 
designated as poor. This is precisely what happened in the last half of the twentieth century. After 
World War II, many non‐Western countries were judged to be poor on the basis of their low gross 
domestic product, and this characterization was used to justify radical attempts to “develop” these 
countries, destroying environments and sustainable ways of life while creating enormously profitable 
“development industries” and a huge transfer of wealth from (now) poor to (now) much richer 
countries.  
We certainly do not wish to blame discourse ethics for all the harms perpetrated by global economic 
development projects. Nevertheless, it is easy to see how such harms may be rationalized by a 
conception of moral justification that depends on universalizability. When concepts like poverty are 
interpreted in a way that is presented as culturally neutral even though it is culturally specific, this 
conceals the fact that the values of a more powerful culture are being legitimated at the expense of the 
values of a culture that is less powerful. The same point could equally well be made using many other 
examples, such as health, wealth, progress, development, and even culture itself. By definition, 
dominant understandings of crucial moral terms are more likely to prevail, while the understandings of 
less powerful cultures are more likely to be seen as mere local preferences, incapable of objective 
validity. 
We contend that it is a philosophical mistake to suppose that any moral concepts, including justice 
concepts, can be excised from the cultural contexts that give them meaning and interpreted in a way 
that is culturally neutral. In situations of diversity and inequality, attempts to identify values in ways that 
are culturally neutral will always privilege the interpretations preferred by the culture that is more 
powerful in those situations. The cultural specificity of the dominant interpretations often will be hard 
to see, however, because the more powerful culture appears as the normal background of life. In 
contexts of diversity and inequality, claims of universalizability and cultural neutrality tend to conceal 
injustice rather than reveal it.8 Thus it is a philosophical mistake not only to suppose that questions of 
morality can be distinguished sharply from questions of ethics. In contexts of diversity and inequality, it 
is a philosophical mistake that lends itself to rationalizing cultural repression.  
4.3. How Discourse Ethics Characterizes Moral Agents 
For discourse ethics, those agents who have standing to participate in justificatory processes are all 
those affected by the issue in question. In order to count as participating, however, they must reason in 
the way prescribed by discourse ethics. Habermas says that problems must be “stylized” “into questions 
of justice, in order to render practical questions accessible to cognitive processing by way of this 
abstraction” (Habermas 1982, 246; emphasis in original; qtd. Benhabib 1992, 72). This means that 
participants must present their considerations in universalizable form and that their responses must also 
take this form. Nonuniversalizable considerations cannot be objects of rational consensus and so may be 
legitimately disregarded.  
Even though discourse ethics is nominally egalitarian and neutral toward all cultures, its conception of 
moral agency can rationalize marginalizing some members of some cultural groups. In order to be 
regarded as full moral agents, some people must, in effect, divest themselves of parts of their specific 
cultural identities. Their local or religious values may be precluded from having moral weight, and if 
people insist on invoking these values their own status as moral agents may come into question. For 
discourse ethics, people who insist on invoking religious or cultural values will at best be demoted to 
moral informants or witnesses, who may have reasons or a viewpoint to contribute, but whose reasons 
must be translated or stylized into universalizable form by bona fide moral agents, those who can divest 
themselves of specific cultural or religious identities. At worst, people who refuse to abandon their 
religious or cultural values may be demoted to the status of objects of moral concern, potential targets 
of paternalistic intervention or reeducation allegedly designed to help them develop full moral agency. 
Many projects for “educating” colonized and indigenous people have used precisely this rationale. Thus 
even though discourse ethics supposedly recognizes the agency of people in all cultures, it actually 
recognizes only agency expressed in a form that is culturally specific. Again, a seemingly abstract 
philosophical thesis about agency can lend itself to rationalizing repression. 
4.4. The Method of Moral Reasoning Prescribed by Discourse Ethics 
The reasoning method prescribed by discourse ethics is “a search for truth organized in the form of a 
competition” (Habermas 1990, 87). The competition is constrained by what Habermas regards as a few 
unavoidable rules of criticism. These include minimal rules of consistency, such as that speakers may not 
contradict themselves and that different speakers may not use the same expression with different 
meanings, and they also include the requirement that speakers be truthful and accountable in the sense 
of providing reasons for their views. The discursive competition must be open to all affected by the 
possible outcome, at least all those “with the competence to speak and act,” and all are formally equal 
to introduce and question any assertions. All participants may question others' assertions, introduce 
their own assertions, and express their own attitudes, desires, and needs. No internal or external 
coercion may exist (1990, 88–89). Habermas notes that, in the real world, additional institutional 
measures are likely to be needed to enable approximation of the ideal speech situation.9 We have 
several concerns about this proposed method of moral reasoning.  
Our first concern is that the requirement of formally equal participation a priori rules out as irrational 
some ways of intersubjectively exchanging reasons. For example, it rules out the epistemic hierarchies 
of some communities, such as elder wisdom and the moral hierarchy of some religions. This begs the 
question of whether alternative reasoning strategies may be more rational in some contexts.  
Our second concern focuses on the assumption of discourse ethics that formal equality enables all 
individuals to participate equally. This problem has been discussed extensively in the feminist literature 
exploring women's domination in discourse. One well‐known example is Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's 
essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (Spivak 1988). In this essay, Spivak argues that “subaltern” Third 
World women are represented in discourse in ways that obscure their subjectivity while promoting the 
interests of the authors of the texts. For instance, Indian widows immolated on their husbands' funeral 
pyres in the practice of sati were represented by British colonizers as victims who had to be saved from 
the slaughter of “backward practices” and by Indian men as heroes. Spivak famously asserts that the 
subaltern remains mute because she “cannot know or speak the text of female exploitation” (1988, 
288).  
Why is the subaltern unable to speak of her exploitation? Perhaps her indigenous language is 
incomprehensible to intellectuals and she cannot produce “texts” because she is illiterate. But why can't 
she even know about her exploitation? Even if she is unfamiliar with classic texts, surely she must be 
aware that something is wrong with her situation? Uma Narayan suggests an answer to this puzzle. She 
writes that certain kinds of oppressive contexts render people unable to conceptualize the injustice to 
which they are subject. For instance, many girls of her grandmother's generation saw themselves as 
personally unfortunate, but they did not locate the causes of their misery in larger social arrangements 
(Narayan 1989, 267–68). Narayan suggests that the subaltern's muteness is rooted in her lack of a 
vocabulary for articulating her injuries and aspirations, and Narayan's diagnosis also implies an 
appropriate remedy: the subaltern needs a more adequate moral vocabulary. Spivak, however, 
contends that no such vocabulary is available. Even supposedly critical vocabularies, such as Marxist 
structuralism and poststructuralism, obscure the distinctive nature of the subaltern woman's 
oppression, leaving her still mute.10 
Language is a public construct, and its absence is a public, not a private, deficit. Creating a new language 
is in principle a collective project, not something that can be accomplished by a single individual. If the 
subaltern were to enter moral discourse as a lone individual, she would be able to communicate only by 
using the dominant language, and her experience would remain distorted and repressed. She can break 
her silence only by collaborating with others in similar situations to develop a public language able to 
express their common experiences. Only by developing a collective identity distinct from her individual 
identity as the particular daughter, wife, and mother of particular others can the subaltern even come to 
see herself as subaltern. And only in this way can she break through the barriers to her knowledge and 
speech. 
The difficulty of developing new vocabularies in the kind of formally open and competitive discourse 
prescribed by discourse ethics is well established.11 We think that, in present‐day contexts of diversity 
and inequality, the insistence of discourse ethics that only such reasoning strategies are morally rational 
allows for the abuse of cultural power.  
Our third and related concern about the reasoning method recommended by discourse ethics is that it 
fails to notice that hearing others speak is an enterprise in which people may succeed, fail, or be 
partially successful. Discourse ethics conceptualizes rational discourse in terms of reversibility or the 
ability to take the point of view of others, but the concept of reversibility is problematic. African‐
American philosopher Laurence Thomas writes that a privileged person who has experienced occasional 
hardships and humiliations does not thereby know what it is like to be subjected to the systematic 
devaluation that constitutes informal racism any more than hanging upside down with closed eyes will 
tell him what it is like to be a bat. Moreover, he argues it would be morally presumptuous to assume 
that one can know. “If one encounters a Holocaust survivor, it would be moral hubris of the worst sort—
unless one is also such a survivor—to assume that by way of rational imaginative role‐taking … one 
could even begin to grasp the depth of that person's experiences—the hurts, pains, and anxieties of that 
individual's life. There is not enough good will in the world to make it possible for persons (who are not 
Holocaust survivors) to put themselves imaginatively in the mind of a Holocaust survivor” (Thomas 
1992–93, 234).  
Iris Young agrees that is often disrespectful and presumptuous to think that we can imaginatively adopt 
other people's standpoints. Doing so assumes that other people are similar to us without acknowledging 
their differences. This belief is politically as well as morally dubious, because privileged people who try 
to put themselves in the position of those who are less privileged are likely to rely on projections and 
fantasies (Young 1997, 48). For instance, they may see the less privileged as leading a simple idyllic 
existence or as utterly miserable. In light of these considerations, we think that the prescription of 
discourse ethics to adopt the perspective of others is at best naïve, overlooking the structural obstacles 
to discourse that are created by cultural diversity and systematic inequalities of power.  
Habermas does not intend his model of domination‐free discourse to serve as a blueprint from which 
real‐world moral argumentation may never deviate. Instead, he intends it as a philosophical ideal 
guiding the design of “institutional measures” capable of “neutraliz(ing) empirical limitations” in the real 
world. Because the ideal of domination‐free discourse is posed at a high level of philosophical 
abstraction, it could be interpreted as allowing a variety of deviations from formal equality, including 
even temporarily closed discourse communities as institutional measures to avoid “external 
interference.” We might conclude that this model of moral reasoning is basically correct but, because it 
is abstract, necessarily limited in its ability to provide concrete guidance for practical reasoning in real‐
world contexts. 
Our main concern is not that the model of good moral reasoning in discourse ethics is abstract and 
consequently indeterminate. Instead, we question the adequacy of an epistemological model that 
regards moral rationality as best exemplified by a discursive competition among equivalently situated 
individuals, paying no theoretical attention to cultural as well as individual diversity and systematic as 
well as individual inequality. Systematic diversity and inequality are ubiquitous. They are not anomalous 
but rather endemic to the human condition as we know it. For this reason, we think they should be 
addressed at the center of even an abstract account of moral reasoning, not left for the level of 
application. In existing contexts of diversity and inequality, it is unlikely to be rational to rely on moral‐
reasoning strategies that fail to build in safeguards against repression and abuse, even though such 
safeguards will never be infallible. Moral reasoning that ignores systematic cultural and social variations 
in moral points of view is likely to permit or even legitimate the repression of “nonmainstream” moral 
perspectives and vocabularies and to fail to facilitate the emergence of new ones. The disregard of 
discourse ethics for the epistemological implications of cultural diversity and social inequality leads it to 
postulate a model of moral reasoning that fails to recognize the collective as well as individual 
dimensions of moral agency and to overemphasize the competitive aspects of moral reasoning at the 
expense of the cooperative aspects, which arguably are more fundamental. 
4.5. Likely Courses of Action Justified by Discourse Ethics 
Discourse ethics insists that it offers no more than an abstract model of moral reasoning, so that action‐
guiding prescriptions emerge only from using this model on specific occasions. For this reason, we might 
suppose that discourse ethics offers no concrete guidance for action that we can assess outside its use 
in a particular context of dispute. However, the restriction by discourse ethics of moral reasoning to 
exclude many “cultural” aspects of the good life has practical implications that are worth considering. 
The term “culture” is capable of many interpretations. Earlier in this article, in suggesting that the 
cultural specificity of interpretations of moral concepts is often overlooked, we pointed toward a broad 
construal of “culture” as pervading most if not all aspects of social life. In the context of contemporary 
political philosophy, however, including the so‐called multiculturalism debate, “culture” is usually 
interpreted more narrowly to contrast with politics and the economy. For example, Nancy Fraser 
contrasts concerns about cultural recognition with concerns about economic redistribution (Fraser 
1997). Susan Okin writes, “[T]he sphere of personal, sexual, and reproductive life provides a central 
focus of most cultures. … Religious or cultural groups are often particularly concerned with ‘personal 
law'—the laws of marriage, divorce, child custody, division and control of family property, and 
inheritance” (1999, 12–13). When “culture” is construed in this narrower way, it has special significance 
for the members of minority cultures and, as is often noted, for women everywhere. Because culture in 
the narrower sense is often seen as a source of women's oppression, The Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action states, “Any harmful aspect of certain traditional, customary or modern practices 
that violates the rights of women should be prohibited and eliminated” (United Nations 1995, point 
224).  
Discourse theorists confront a dilemma. If they accept the narrow understanding of culture usual in 
contemporary political philosophy, it follows that discourse ethics is unable to provide guidance on 
many normative issues that have special importance for those who are typically more vulnerable, 
namely, women and the members of minority cultures. On the other hand, if discourse theorists decide 
to enlarge the domain of morality so that it includes some hitherto excluded issues, then it seems 
inevitable that local values will be trumped by values regarded as universal, such as human rights. It 
appears likely that the members of more marginalized or vulnerable cultures, perhaps characterized as 
“traditional” or even “simple,” “backward,” or “exotic,” may be asked to abandon what they regard as 
central aspects of their identities and lives. 
4.6. Summing Up Our Assessment of Discourse Ethics 
In this section, we draw on our four assessment conditions to evaluate the reliability of the model of 
moral justification recommended by discourse ethics. Although there are surely situations in which this 
strategy works well, we conclude that, in situations of diversity and inequality, it consistently tends to 
deliver dubious or untrustworthy conclusions. 
4.6.1. Plausibility 
First, we consider the plausibility of the metastory told by discourse ethics. In a classic example of 
aprioristic moral epistemology conducted from the armchair, Habermas asserts that the conditions of 
formal equality express the universal and necessary presuppositions of argumentative speech or the 
concept of being convinced. Many modern Western philosophers, especially contractarians and neo-
Kantians, would certainly agree that this type of reasoning is precisely what is required to convince 
them. Such a story is also likely to be plausible to members of the juridical administrative classes in 
modern societies; indeed, something like it is presupposed by most modern legal systems and 
bureaucracies. The story is not plausible, however, to members of hierarchical moral communities, in 
which some members are regarded as having superior moral knowledge. It is also unlikely to convince 
the more vulnerable members of nominally egalitarian communities, who may have suffered 
intimidation or silencing in situations where they have formally had their say, such as law courts or 
formal hearings. The reasoning model that discourse ethics recommends for moral justification is not 
equally plausible to all groups, and, in the present world order, it is more likely to appear fair and 
unbiased to those occupying more privileged positions in more powerful cultures. 
4.6.2. Usability 
Is the model of moral justification found in discourse ethics equally usable by all? At first sight, it is hard 
to imagine a prescriptive model that could be more open and egalitarian. We have seen, however, that 
the insistence by discourse ethics on using a supposedly neutral and universalizable vocabulary is based 
on a philosophical mistake that in practice allows members of the dominant culture to conduct moral 
discussion in their terms. It allows the dominant vocabulary to go unmarked as culturally specific and 
legitimates the moral perspective that this vocabulary embodies. More generally, the requirement by 
discourse ethics that religion and culture be bracketed advantages people who do not consider their 
religion as central to their lives and do not regard themselves as belonging to any specific culture. 
People for whom religion and culture are central may find this strategy rationally disabling and their 
views in effect excluded from discourse. 
4.6.3. Nonabusiveness 
Does the model of moral justification offered by discourse ethics permit the abuse of power? In our 
view, fairness and truth are unlikely to be promoted by a practice of reasoning that ignores pervasive 
cultural diversity and social inequality. Although Habermas pays lip service to the need for institutional 
mechanisms to counteract inequality, he gives no theoretical attention to the ways in which, in the real 
world, those who have more cultural and social power are likely to exert disproportionate influence in 
deciding how to interpret and use the prescriptive model of discourse ethics. His theory disregards the 
facts that the powerful will have disproportionate influence in deciding: what is on the moral agenda; 
how the issues should be framed; who is counted as a participant with interests at stake; how 
participants' contributions should be formulated; what is seen as legitimate evidence and argument; 
which inequalities are determined to be minor enough to be disregarded; when sufficient time for 
consensus has passed; and when the discussion is over. 
4.6.4. Practical Feasibility 
Does the model for moral justification presented by discourse ethics tend to justify recommendations 
for action that are feasible alternatives for those involved? This question cannot be answered 
conclusively in the abstract, without seeing how the strategy works in the context of a particular 
dispute. We do know, however, that discourse ethics is unable, on its own admission, to address many 
issues that it defines as “cultural” or ethical, and we also know that these are precisely the issues that 
often have disproportionate importance to the lives of those who are more vulnerable. Moreover, since 
the strategy tends to provide more privileged groups with an unfair advantage in justifying their views, it 
seems reasonable to speculate that, when this strategy is used in circumstances of diversity and 
inequality, it is unlikely to support courses of action that are equally feasible for everyone. 
5. The Fundamental Problem: Three Layers of Invidious Idealization 
5.1. What Is Idealization? 
“Idealization” is a term with many possible meanings, not only outside philosophy but also increasingly 
within it.12 We use “idealization” in the sense explained by Onora O'Neill, who writes, “An assumption, 
and derivatively a theory, idealizes when it ascribes predicates—often seen as enhanced, ‘ideal’ 
predicates—that are false of the case in hand, and so denies predicates that are true of that case. For 
example, if human beings are assumed to have capacities and capabilities for rational choice or self‐
sufficiency or independence from others that are evidently not achieved by many or even by any actual 
human beings, the result is not mere abstraction; it is idealization” (1996, 41).13 
O'Neill notes that idealizations can be theoretically useful but warns that they are also dangerous. She 
writes, “[W]e learn something interesting about economic behaviour by considering ‘idealized’ 
consumers and ‘perfect’ markets. But if as economic actors we assume that consumers and markets live 
up to these idealizing fictions we will fail to adjust our action to actual circumstances, and may pay, or 
exact, a heavy price. Practical reasoning that assumes that ‘ideal’ predicates are satisfied will not reach 
conclusions safely and soundly for cases where they are not satisfied” (1996, 41). We agree with O'Neill 
that idealization can be useful and even indispensable for philosophers, who aim to provide general 
accounts of the fundamental features of our world and lives. In order to avoid inessential details, 
philosophers (and other theorists) often need to make simplifying and even counterfactual assumptions. 
Some philosophical idealizations are not harmless, however; instead, they are invidious or 
philosophically damaging. Below we explain why the harmfulness of the model of moral justification in 
discourse ethics stems from its invidious idealization of domination‐free discourse. In the following 
section, we contend that the broader metaphilosophical conception of the mission and method of moral 
epistemology that discourse ethics assumes is also (and not coincidentally) invidiously idealized. 
5.2. The Model of Moral Justification Offered by Discourse Ethics Is Invidiously 
Idealized 
The model of moral justification recommended by discourse ethics brackets or imagines away diversity 
and inequality. We have seen how this occurs in the exclusion by discourse ethics of many topics and 
considerations from the realm of possible moral assessment, in the ways it limits the expression of 
moral agency, and in its failure to envision safeguards for cultural difference and social inequality. 
Bracketing or imagining away diversity and inequality may well be safe for some philosophical purposes, 
but it is surely unsafe when seeking to develop an account of moral justification for use in a world 
pervaded by diversity and inequality. 
In a world of diversity and inequality, the model of moral justification recommended by discourse ethics 
tends systematically to favor the moral perspectives of people with more privilege and power. For this 
reason, discourse ethics is unlikely to provide an adequate reasoning strategy for fairly resolving 
disputes among people who hold diverse religious and cultural views and/or who are unequally situated. 
The interpretations by discourse ethics of the moral domain, of moral agency, and of moral reasoning 
purport to be universal or culturally neutral, but we have seen that in fact they are not only culturally 
specific but also specific to the cultures that currently wield most power in the global context. Discourse 
ethics advocates a model of moral justification that lends itself to justifying the abuse of social power 
both in process and in outcome. Moreover, by insisting that authoritative claims can be produced only 
through reasoning according to this model, discourse ethics disguises partiality as impartiality and opens 
the way for philosophy itself to be used as a tool of repression. 
Our criticisms of discourse ethics do not mean that we reject the ideal of domination‐free discourse; to 
the contrary, commitment to this ideal is implicit in our conditions for assessing models and practices of 
justification. We dispute, however, the idea that a single privileged prescriptive model for achieving 
domination‐free discourse can be imagined independently of specific contexts. In some contexts, we 
think that domination‐free discourse will look very different from the formally open and competitive 
procedures imagined by discourse ethics. Whether, where, and how to engage in discursive justification 
must be decided in a power‐aware way in particular contexts, always with an eye to new forms of 
exclusion and power abuse. 
5.3. Discourse Ethics Assumes a Misleadingly Idealized Conception of the Mission 
of Moral Epistemology 
Justification is a social process. It consists in giving accounts and exchanging reasons. A moral conclusion 
is not justified simply in virtue of the fact that the persons arriving at the conclusion have correctly 
identified an action or practice as morally wrong, even when they have presented what they regard as 
good reasons for their conclusion. The conclusion is justified by the account that is given to others about 
why the action is wrong, by the argumentation and reasons offered, and by others' responsive uptake of 
that account. Discourse ethics recognizes that justification is achieved through the intersubjective 
exchange of reasons, and it insists on the indispensability of actual as opposed to imagined discourse. 
For this reason, we think that even though the account of moral justification by discourse ethics is still 
flawed in the way we diagnose, it is less idealized than those offered by many other neo‐Kantian 
theories. Nevertheless, we argue in this section that discourse ethics, like many other philosophical 
theories, assumes a general conception of moral justification that is also invidiously idealized because it 
fails to take seriously a vital implication of its insistence that moral justification occurs in actual 
intersubjective exchanges. This implication is that moral justification, precisely because it is social, is also 
always situated. 
Moral justification always occurs (or fails) in particular contexts. The need for justification arises when a 
particular action or social practice faces a particular challenge and must be justified to a particular 
individual or group of people. This means that practices for justification must be tailored to the situation 
at hand. Even though occasions of successful justification must always meet the conditions of 
plausibility, usability, nonabusiveness, and practical feasibility, the ways in which those conditions are 
fulfilled will vary according to the context. The same strategies of justification may be plausible, usable, 
nonabusive, and practically feasible in one context and fail some or all of those conditions in another. 
Plausibility and intelligibility are obviously relative to particular addressees, and who are the relevant 
addressees depends on the particular dispute in question. Which strategies are usable and practically 
feasible also depends on the particular situation. Therefore, in moral reasoning across communities, the 
appropriate moral vocabulary and forms of reasoning cannot be assumed but instead must be 
negotiated and perhaps invented. 
Does this situated conception of moral justification result in moral subjectivism or relativism? If some 
people accept the justifications offered for a particular action or practice and some won't or can't accept 
them, does this mean that the same action or practice may be morally permissible for some people but 
impermissible for others? In this regard, moral justification is no different from scientific justification. 
Just as not everyone accepts the arguments for the view that slavery is wrong, so not everyone accepts 
the scientific justifications provided for the view that the earth is not flat. We think that both these 
claims are certainly true because they are supported by the best reasons available to the moral and 
scientific communities to which we belong. We recognize, however, that the members of some 
communities continue to doubt and that these skeptics can be persuaded only if they are presented 
with evidence and arguments that, in context, meet their conditions of plausibility, usability, 
nonabusiveness, and feasibility. It begs the question to insist that only our reasons are good; those with 
whom we are disputing must also recognize them as good.14 As O'Neill says, “Since practical reasoning 
has many audiences, some more restricted and others more inclusive, it may and indeed must on 
different occasions rely on more abstract and on more specific views of the characteristics of those 
audiences” (1996, 61). No claims are justified in general, for all time, or sub specie aeternitatis. The 
claims that slavery is wrong and that the earth is not flat are extremely unlikely to be defeated, since 
denying them would mean rejecting extremely extensive networks of established moral and scientific 
belief. Nevertheless, even these beliefs are defeasible in principle, if we are willing to change enough of 
our other beliefs (Quine 1951). Even the most considered convictions are fixed only provisionally, and if 
they are not to be held dogmatically they must remain open to rethinking as new insights or evidence or 
means of argumentation become available. Once this is recognized and moral justification is understood 
as a collection of practices that are always socially situated, it becomes clear that no single model or 
practice of moral justification can be expected to work in all contexts. Moral authority does not emerge 
from the use of some supermodel. Instead, it emerges from a good fit between specific reasoning 
strategies and the social contexts in which they are used. Our conditions are designed to assess this fit. 
To pursue an all‐purpose supermodel is to idealize invidiously the nature of moral justification and the 
mission of moral epistemology.  
5.4. Abandoning the Search for the Philosopher's Stone and Rethinking the Mission 
of Moral Epistemology 
Medieval philosophers sought the so‐called philosopher's stone that would convert base metals into 
gold. Similarly, many contemporary philosophers seek a single privileged model of moral argumentation 
that will enable its users to turn base and fallacious everyday reasoning into a gold standard of rational 
argumentation. We have argued that this search rests on a philosophical superstition, an invidiously 
idealized conception of the philosopher's mission that is not only misleading but also morally and 
politically dangerous. 
If moral epistemology is no longer taken to be the search for a uniquely privileged model of moral 
reasoning that leads to a single authoritative moral point of view, how might its mission be 
reconceptualized? We propose that moral epistemology should seek to develop a variety of 
epistemological models useful for guiding practices of moral reasoning in differing social contexts, 
together with guidelines explaining the types of situations where the practices prescribed by the models 
are likely to work well because they meet our conditions of adequacy. We suggest that these models be 
regarded as exemplars of moral justification. 
Once the mission of moral epistemology is rethought, its method must be rethought as well. Because all 
moral knowledge is situated and there can be no uniquely privileged moral point of view, moral 
justification does not begin at a single designated starting point, end at a single finishing point, or 
proceed by a single best route. We need multiple maps for multiple journeys. It is not plausible that 
multiple maps for many journeys, some still unplanned, can be drawn successfully by solitary 
philosophers sitting alone in their armchairs. In our companion article, we explain our alternative 
naturalized conception of the method of moral epistemology, which requires both moral teamwork and 
moral fieldwork. 
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Footnotes 
1 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World‐News/2011/03/04/Frances‐veil‐ban‐effective‐in‐April/UPI‐
71011299247319/#ixzz1FqAsqNfu (accessed 6 March 2011); 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world‐europe‐14261921 (accessed 23 July 2011).  
2 http://www.believermag.com/issues/200303/?read=interview_strawson (last accessed 30 April 2013).  
3 The adequacy conditions that we propose contain obviously normative elements, but we regard 
normative constraints as logically appropriate for moral rationality in the same way that 
empirical adequacy is a logically appropriate constraint on scientific rationality. Science seeks to 
determine how the world actually is, so it is appropriately constrained by empirical adequacy; 
morality seeks to determine how the world should be, so is appropriately subject to normative 
constraints.  
4 We do not assert that our conditions provide a full account of moral justification. Even if substantive 
normative claims are supported by arguments that meet all of our conditions, it is possible that 
further conditions might have to be met in order for the claims to be fully justified or 
authoritative.  
5 We recognize that the language of power abuse is more unusual in philosophy than the language of 
equality, freedom, and community but we find that this language is well suited for our purposes, 
which include identifying ways in which members of more powerful groups have utilized 
seemingly neutral reasoning strategies to rationalize their own agendas. Although we endorse 
the broad values of freedom, equality, and community, we want to mark our distance from 
some customary interpretations of them, particularly interpretations that dismiss the possibility 
that hierarchies might sometimes have moral or epistemic worth.  
6 In earlier work, Habermas spoke of the rules as defining an ideal speech situation but later came to 
prefer the terminology of an “unrestricted communication community” (die ideale 
Kommunicationsgemeinschaft) (1990, 88). He also sometimes speaks of constraint‐free or 
domination‐free communication.  
7 Elisabeth Furst‐L'Orange recalls: “I particularly remember one woman, as I talked about Moldova as a 
severely poor country. ‘Don't say we're poor,’ she begged me. Well, this is a fact, I responded. 
‘But we are so much more! Think about our lovely countryside, think about our rich culture, our 
food and wine!'” (Furst‐L'Orange 2010).  
8 In a similar spirit, Helen Longino has argued compellingly that the aspiration to identify a politically 
and morally neutral method for selecting politically unbiased theories in science is misguided 
because there is no neutral “view” that can be discerned independently of context. No science is 
value free, and the ideal of value‐free science is a dangerous idealization because it hides the 
often pernicious operations of political and social power in the practice of science under the 
pretense of “scientific objectivity.” As Longino puts it, “We should worry more about the 
concealing of political agendas behind the mantle of scientific neutrality than about the 
consequences of abandoning the illusion of neutral arbiters of our cognitive practices” (1990, 
55).  
9 Habermas recognizes that real‐world “discourses take place in particular social contexts and are 
subject to the limitations of time and space. Their participants are not Kant's intelligible 
characters but real human beings driven by other motives in addition to the one permitted 
motive of the search for truth. … Because of all these factors, institutional measures are needed 
to sufficiently neutralize empirical limitations and avoidable internal and external interference 
so that the idealized conditions always already presupposed by participants in argumentation 
can at least be adequately approximated.” Particular “conventions that help to actualize the 
ideal content of the presuppositions of argumentation under empirical conditions” must be 
differentiated from the rules of discourse, to avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (1990, 
93).  
10 In speaking of cases when no conceptual resources are yet available for members of oppressed social 
groups to make their experiences of oppression intelligible, even to themselves, Miranda Fricker 
uses the term “hermeneutical injustice.” She regards such hermeneutical gaps as unjust when 
oppressive social relations are partially responsible for the epistemic deficiency, for example, 
when oppressive gender norms operate to keep women isolated from one another and 
excluded from public life, so that they are prevented from collective discourse through which 
new vocabularies are developed (Fricker 2007, 147–75).  
11 The history of science is full of accounts of “invisible colleges” or groups of scientists working from 
shared assumptions, which David L. Hull calls “demes” (1988, 433–34). Artists have often 
worked in “schools,” and philosophers in “circles.” Nancy Fraser argues that repressed groups 
form “subaltern counterpublics” that are “parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (1990, 67). Jaggar argues that small 
communities, whose members are known personally to each other, have been indispensable to 
the development of Western feminist perspectives, allowing members to develop a distinct 
moral vocabulary that offers alternative understandings of social phenomena (Jaggar 2000).  
12 For instance, a vigorous debate is currently under way concerning the usefulness of Rawlsian ideal 
theory as a methodological approach in political philosophy.  
13 O'Neill is very concerned to distinguish between idealization and abstraction, which she defines as “a 
matter of bracketing, but not of denying, predicates that are true of the matter under 
discussion” (1996, 40). We think that O'Neill and philosophers following her lead may have 
overblown the importance of this distinction. Bracketing or ignoring predicates such as diversity 
and inequality may be logically distinct from explicitly denying their existence, but in many cases 
the difference does not seem to us substantial. Bracketing or ignoring diversity and inequality 
may still be misleading and philosophically dangerous by directing philosophical attention away 
from areas where it should focus. However, whether or not O'Neill's distinction between 
abstraction and idealization is worth maintaining does not affect our present argument.  
14 Of course, the skeptics' reasoning itself can be evaluated by the adequacy conditions we propose. To 
the extent that people have not completely removed themselves from social life and have to 
account to other people for their beliefs, then they too must offer argumentation and reasoning 
that are plausible, usable, nonabusive, and feasible.  
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